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Abstract
Purpose:  Identify  similarities  and/or  differences  in  the  distribution  of  Value  Added
characterizing family businesses as opposed to non-family held firms, and analyse productivity
by linking the distribution of  the wealth generated by the company to a variety of  related agents
or stakeholders(employees, providers of  loan capital, and shareholders).
Design/methodology: A  data  series  consisting  of  VA distribution  in  a  sample  of  8,609
Spanish companies, of  which 5,109 are family firms and another 3,500 companies which are
not, for the period comprising 2008 to 2013 was employed for this study. The data from the
financial statements pertaining to these companies was taken from the SABI system (a privately-
funded  database  analysing  the  financials  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  firms,  operated  by
INFORMA, SA), selecting only those companies that employ standardized financial reporting
practices.
Findings: The work shows the existence of  significant differences between family and non-
family businesses in the distribution of  value added among the different stakeholders. Given
that, although both types of  company spend most of  the value added to remunerate staff, the
family company spends a higher proportion thereof  on self-financing as compared to non-
family businesses, which spend a higher percentage on the remuneration of  firm ownership. On
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the other hand, the lower labour productivity of  family businesses is apparent, a result that can
be explained both by the lower staff  monetary remuneration, as well as the use of  production
technologies that are also less capital-intensive.
Research limitations/implications:  The study included only medium and large companies.
These are companies that report financial statements offering more disaggregated data (through
use of  the standard forms).This owes to the legal requirement of  these companies to file a cash
flow statement, a necessary source for deriving information on dividends paid by the company.
Originality/value: This is the first study in which the workings of  added value are used to
analyse the presence of  measurable management differences in a large sample of  companies
using family ownership as the main criteria for differentiation.
Keywords: Family Business, Value Added, Stakeholders, Productivity
Jel Codes: G30, G32, G35
1. Introduction
Since the advent of  The Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975), the financial literature has paid attention to
some of  the advantages of  having information on the distribution of  value added (VA) in the firm.
Analysing VA serves to draw attention to the effort made by a company to create wealth and generate
national income, but it is also interesting to analyse how that value is distributed among the economic
agents that contributed to its creation.
From the statement on VA distribution, it is possible to verify if  a given firm can meet its obligations in
terms of  salary, tax, interest and dividend payments from the wealth created, or whether the levels of
these  payments  may be  increased by  creating  additional  wealth  above  what  the  company  plans  to
achieve.
Previous studies on family businesses (FBs) have shown that such firms have a common culture which
plays out in the form of  behavioural differences from practices at non-family businesses (NFBs). For
example, one factor widely discussed in the literature concerns the borrowing and financing policies of
these companies. Thus, in most studies, the existence of  lower debt levels in family businesses, both
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long term (Agrawal & Nagarajan, 1990) and short term (McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko, 2001) is
observed. In the same vein, some studies have found that family businesses prefer to be financed by
funds from the family itself  (Hamilton & Fox, 1998;  Romano, Tanewski & Smyrnios, 2000) or by
retained earnings (Hamilton & Fox, 1998; Barton & Matthews, 1989), while bank debt or an entry of
new shareholders are last among FB preferences.
This choice among funding sources was shown in previous work, such as Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003),
Hu, Wang and Zhang (2008), and Gallizo, Moreno and Sánchez (2014), where the tendency towards
favouring restrictive dividend policy and retention of  profits in favour of  greater financial autonomy is
confirmed.
This self-financing policy followed by FBs has to do, as noted in Romano et al. (2000), with the interest
in maintaining control of  the company in the event of  being unable to meet debt obligations. This
preference  for  control  limits  the  possibilities  of  growth  for  family  businesses.  Numerous  studies
regarding  the  influence  of  size  in  company  management  (Reynolds,  1995;  Cromie,  Stephenson &
Montieth, 1995; Westhead & Cowling, 1998; Duréndez & Garcia, 2005; Galve & Salas, 2011), indicate
that it is for this reason that family enterprises tend to be smaller as compared to similar NFBs.
There  are  other  differences  between  FBs  and  NFBs  that  may  have  an  impact  on  balance  sheet
structures and results, including qualitative and quantitative factors. Among the more qualitative factors,
a lower level  of  management training in family businesses, a result  that could be explained by the
observable preference to see family members assume leadership positions, regardless of  possessing or
not the skill set to do so, which a priori could act to impair firm efficiency (Cromie, Dunn, Sproull &
Chalmers, 2001).
Considering the above, we hypothesize that these and other traits of  the FB determine Value Added
(VA) allocations, as reflected in their value-added statements (VAS), and which materially differ from
those reported among NFBs.
The work presented is exploratory, and involves obtaining VA distribution data sets for a sample of
family and non-family businesses, then extracting the behavioural differences, as well as an analysis of
firm productivity based on these data.
The interest  of  the  approach taken lies  in  the  fact  that,  if  we manage to prove  the  existence  of
differences in the distribution of  VA between family and non-family businesses, we might be able to
better flesh out agency theory when and as applied to family businesses, in which a reward system for
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economic agents is assumed to pertain. According to this theory, a relationship of  agency arises in
private companies in which shareholders delegate responsibility to a third party in order to undertake
management functions on behalf  of  ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This agency relationship is
different in the FB, where family members exert the leadership of  the company and have their own
interests. If  a firm's directors are the family owners, their actions tend to be oriented toward preserving
wealth and control of  the family firm, whereas if  the directors are outside CEOs, they especially tend
to set profitability as the main goal.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses some of  the characteristics of  FBs
that  influence the distribution of  VA.  In the  third section the  relation between Value Added and
Labour Productivity is defined. In the fourth section, the sample used is discussed, and the fifth section
presents  and  analyses  the  results  obtained.  Finally,  section  6  presents  a  summary  of  the  main
conclusions reached.
2. VA distribution and family business
Value Added refers to the increase in the wealth generated and derived from the productive use of
company  resources  prior  to  its  distribution  among  stakeholders,  including;  personnel,  financial
institutions,  government,  owners  and the  company  itself  (Bao & Bao,  1998).  Value  added can  be
calculated by adding personnel costs and financial expenses to income before taxes, or by deducting
outside acquisitions from net turnover, in which we include all expenses incurred in the purchase of
goods and services from other companies (Belkaoui, 1988).
Value  added is  a  measurable  outcome which  the  company  must  annually  decide  to  distribute.  To
perform an analysis of  income distribution, the Value-Added Statement is the best form to put into a
single document and in the same perspective the interests of  the various players involved in the activity
of  the company (Gallizo, Gargallo & Salvador, 2002).
Based on the uses made of  value added, our study is interesting because it allows determining if  the
management style of  family businesses, which try to preserve their patrimony and maintain control of
the  firm  to  pass  it  on  to  future  generations,  presupposes  a  different  VA distribution  among  the
economic agents of  the company.
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2.1. Receipt by workers/employees
The ratio of  compensation to workers and employees is given by the following ratio:
 Ratio of VA distributed t o labour= Salary ExpenseValue−Added
This ratio expresses the amount the company has allocated in the form of  Salaries, Wages and Benefits
in order to obtain one unit  of  VA. An improvement in the ratio represents  an increase in labour
productivity. From the point of  view of  workers, the ratio shows their share of  VA distribution in
relation to other beneficiaries, it being possible to frame as a claim by labour, or as an incentive to
increase work productivity, there existing a certain parallelism between real growth rates in the revenues
generated per unit of  wages, and the amount of  staff  costs in real terms.
The literature shows that the human resource practices employed in family businesses generally take
different approaches, as a function of  the complexity of  the relationships between family and non-
family members and with the company (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Reid & Adams, 2001). According
to Schulze et al. (2001), this is because the ownership / management / family / company relationships
act  to create  a  specific  and unique scenario,  in  which relations  are  commonly  created and mutual
expectations grounded on psychological factors other than contractual, based on emotions, feelings and
values.  This  leads  to  the  rewards  received by workers  often resulting  from a greater  emphasis  on
seniority as a criterion for promotion and for setting salary levels (Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-
Marin, 2007), and reward systems tend to give more weight to non-monetary factors (Cruz, Gómez-
Mejia  & Becerra,  2010).  From which  we  may  conclude  that  FBs  offer  their  workers  other,  non-
pecuniary incentives such as trust, fairness, loyalty, or even greater job stability in times of  crisis. It is
therefore expected that FBs will devote lower VA amounts, as compared to NFBs, to pay their workers.
2.2. Receipt by providers of  loan capital
In economic terms, remuneration to loan capital is understood as a factor of  production, and as such it
falls  within income distribution analysis, with acceptance of  the fluctuating nature of  interest rates,
depending on circumstances in financial markets.
The ratio of  income devoted to providers of  loan capital is given by:
-8-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.916
 Ratio of VA distributed t o outside capital= Interest ExpenseValue−Added
This ratio explains the debt interest that is required to obtain one unit of  total VA. A low result of  this
ratio will indicate less dependence on banks. The calculation of  this ratio can also be used by financial
institutions  in  trend  analysis,  as  an  indicator  for  predicting  the  expected  return  on  interest,  and
consequently calculate the risks associated with lending.
As discussed above, the higher risk aversion of  FBs is conducive to their being less indebted than
NFBs in terms of  financial structure. FBs possess less long-term debt, and therefore carry a lower debt
burden (McConaughy et al., 2001). Moreover, it is expected that FBs, owing to their smaller size and
family  involvement  in  management,  will  establish  closer  ties  with  financial  institutions  to  reduce
information asymmetries,  and thus gain greater access to funding and better terms.  In this  regard,
recent studies have noted the existence of  a lower cost of  debt among family businesses (Duréndez,
Hernández, Madrid & Ramón, 2012; Gallizo et al., 2014). Therefore, the expectation is that FBs will
devote lower proportions of  VA to remunerate loan capital.
2.3. Receipt by government
The infrastructure provided by the Government allows for the productive activity of  firms, so it is
undeniable  that  government  plays  a  role  of  great  importance  as  an  economic  agent.  Indeed,  the
Government provides support in the form of  investment in infrastructure, and apart from providing
other service infrastructures to create value, the Government, income and other tax administration,
undertakes the required investments for the development of  the socioeconomic system (McLeay, 1983).
The following ratio shows the portion of  returns devoted to Government:
 Ratio of VA distributed t o Government= Tax ExpenseValue−Added
It is known that there exists in no EU country any tax advantage to being a family business, but it is
also true  that  there  are  exemptions  for  reinvestment  that  are favourable  to family  businesses.  The
reason  lies  in  their  tendency  to  reinvest  profits  rather  than  distribute  dividends.  Similarly,  other
incentives, such as additional deductions for investments or professional training expenses relating to
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the employer or relatives working in the company, may be some of  the other incentives that most
benefit family firms.
Studies such as Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin (2010) show that family businesses are fiscally less bold
than non-family businesses, mainly because they are more concerned about the impact that such a
posture might have on small shareholders, as well as any possible sanctions that may arise and/or the
impact on family reputation. However, other studies show that the family businesses perform better tax
planning, showing that FBs are interested in pursuing policies that are incentivized fiscally, yet cannot
constitute a problem in terms of  corporate image (Morris, Willians, Allen & Avila, 1997).
From all this, it follows that family businesses can undertake better tax planning in order to reduce their
tax burden; however, this effect could be seen as offset by the fact that, in turn, FBs can be observed to
also be less aggressive in pursuing riskier forms of  tax reduction. To that effect, Sánchez and Moreno
(2014) showed no significant differences between the tax rates paid by FBs and NFBs, which leads us
to believe that differences in the distribution of  VA in this domain may be materially irrelevant.
2.4. Receipt by shareholders
The ratio  of  dividends  paid  out  to  share  capital  determines  the  amount  of  added value  devoted
shareholders.
 Ratio of VA distributed t o Shareholders= DividendsValue−Added
As noted above,  the financial  structures of  FBs have certain features that differentiate them from
NFBs. Thus, a stricter hierarchy is observed in their own financing preferences, FBs being more risk
averse and maintaining more restrictive dividend policies (Romano et  al.,  2000).  In times of  crisis,
family  business  owners  opt  to  distribute  fewer  dividends  in  order  to  avoid  recurring  to  outside
financing,  and to maintain control  of  the company within the family,  ensuring that  this  control  is
transferred to future generations. This is contrary to the case of  NFBs, especially among listed firms,
where  there  is  shareholder  pressure  to  maintain  the  pay-out  ratios  and/or  amounts,  even  if  this
negatively  impacts  equity  levels.  Thus,  we  sense  that  the  proportion  of  VA that  FBs  allocate  to
dividends is less than the allocations made among NFBs.
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2.5. To provide for maintenance and expansion of  the company
This ratio tracks the internal generation of  resources for maintenance and expansion of  assets; both in
terms of  providing for depreciation of  fixed assets, and for provisioning reserves to bolster firm equity.
 Ratio of VAdistributed t o Self −Financing=Depreciation Expense an d Self −FinancingValue−Added
FBs exhibit a marked preference for the retention of  profits, and for this reason have higher equity on
the balance sheet than do NFBs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). One of  the salient characteristics of  FBs is
the preference for self-financing, as well as the willingness of  shareholders to receive a lower return on
capital, in exchange for avoiding excessive risk and ensuring the survival of  the company for future
generations.
Several authors argue that it is the FB preference for control that acts as the main constraint on their
growth.  This  preference  acts  as  a  limitation  of  a  financial  nature,  under  the  assumption  that  the
company has sufficient resources to finance its growth, and without excessive exposure of  personal
wealth, a substantial part of  which is invested in the firm (Galve & Salas, 2011). Therefore, FBs are
expected to allocate a greater proportion of  VA to self-financing than do NFBs.
3. Value added and labour productivity
3.1. Theoretical framework
Wage and labour productivity are important economic indicators, and the relationship between them
has been analysed in numerous studies in applied economics. In many of  these studies, there was an
attempt to quantify standards of  living by regions or economic sector. From these data, it is possible to
identify such standards because the distribution of  income between labour and capital depends on this
relationship (Tamasauskiene & Stankaityte, 2013).
The VA itself  is a measure of  output and, when combined as a ratio with a figure that measures some
attribute of  the workforce,  we then have a measure of  labour productivity (Morley,  1978).  In this
article, we measured labour productivity through the following ratios:
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• Value-Added /Wages
• Value-Added /Number of  employees
In both cases, higher ratio values indicate that the company is efficient in the use of  labour, while
declines in the ratio signal the firm should adopt measures to correct the imbalances observed.
Although  the  two  ratios  measure  the  same  concept,  there  is  some  consensus  around  the  greater
suitability of  the former(VA/Wages), as it eliminates the effect inflation can have on the outcome (both
variables being in currency units), and because it avoids the problem that occupational seasonality may
introduce in the second ratio (the number of  workers in a company can vary substantially depending
on the time of  year and/or the economic sector).
In the literature, labour productivity has been traditionally associated with Wages, with some studies
finding a positive relationship between the two variables, especially in the short term (Mankiw, 2011;
Huizinga & Broer, 2004; Wakeford, 2004; Narayan & Smith, 2009). Previously, we observed that FBs
provide less monetary compensation to their employees compared to NFBs, a factor that could affect
their levels of  productivity. To verify this idea, we present the data for labour productivity by type of
business. Bear in mind that comparisons between companies through these productivity ratios can lead
to misinterpretations when not taking into consideration that some industries are more capital-intensive
than others, which could lead to assigning greater productivity to workers when, in reality, the higher
measure owes to higher capital investments (Morley, 1978). Therefore, to compare the productivity of
FBs  and  NFBs,  we  will  estimate  labour  productivity  by  grouping  the  companies  by  industry  or
economic sector (primary, secondary and tertiary).
3.2. Formulating a Hypothesis regarding labour productivity
Finding a linear relationship between labour productivity and wages is a classic problem. There are
economists who say that relationship holds whenever a firm is managing its resources with a view
toward  profit  maximization  (Mankiw,  2011).  In  our  case,  we  will  verify  the  existence  of  such  a
relationship by distinguishing between family and non-family businesses. The reason is that the various
management styles employed in each type of  business can lead to differences in productivity.
Thus, considering these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis.
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H1: There is a linear relationship between labour productivity and Wages, in both FBs and NFBs.
Some authors claim that human resource management in FBs responds to the need to preserve socio-
emotional wealth (SEW), and that this aspect has a positive impact on organizational performance
(Cruz, Firfiray & Gómez-Mejía, 2011), i.e., workers identify with the objectives of  the company and
become more productive. But it has also been shown otherwise, concluding that FB personnel policies
have  been  guided  by  the  need  for  creating  jobs  for  relatives,  making  firm  efficiency  a  secondary
criterion  (Jorissen,  Laveren,  Martens  &  Reheul,  2005).  This  leads  us  to  formulate  the  following
hypothesis:
H2: FBs are able to leverage their ties with employees, longevity in the workforce and other advantages from
workforce stability in order to produce positive differences in productivity compared to NFBs.
Solving this problem is important for shareholders and prospective investors trying to assess the return
on investment in a business environment in which the influence of  a family in the business is a factor.
Achieving higher labour productivity may be concomitant with better economic results, so a broader
understanding of  this issue would facilitate investor decision-making.
4. Sample Data
4.1. Selection Criteria
In an empirical study of  this nature, in which business data is handled, the first task is to define the
concept of  "family business" that will be used to identify firms as being family-owned or not.
It is common to think of  family businesses as those in which ownership and control are in the hands
of  a group of  people who share family ties; however, it is not an easy task to empirically distinguish
between family and non-family businesses.
One of  the key issues for identifying a business as an FB lies in the difference between firms that have
highly  disperse  ownership  structures  versus  those  with  high  ownership  concentration.  These
differences  are  what  cause  controversy  about  what  percentage  is  most  appropriate  for  classifying
companies as family-owned. In this regard, we are of  the opinion that it is not appropriate to apply the
same percentages to all companies, meaning that, from the information available in the SABI database,
the process of  final classification was made according to the filters presented in Table 1.
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OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE
TYPE
Disperse ownership
structure
(SABI 'A' and 'B'
independence indicators):
No shareholder owns more
than 50% of  capital.
Concentrated ownership
structure
(SABI 'C' and 'D'
independence
indicators): A
shareholder owns more
than 50% of  capital
Unknown ownership structure
(SABI 'U' independence indicator)
Question
Does a single person own
more than 5% individually, or
does a family collectively hold
more than 20%?
Does a single person or
family own more than
50% overall? or: Are there
executives who hold more
than 50% of  capital?
Are there known shareholders?
Answer Yes No Yes No Yes No
Question
Is there an
individual
shareholder who is a
member of  the
Board, or are there
executive
shareholders
holding more than
20% of  capital?
   
Is a natural person and
shareholder a member
of  the Board?
 
Answer Yes No    Yes No  
Resulting
Classification FB NFB NFB FB NFB FB Uncertain Uncertain
Table 1. FB/NFB classification according to SABI-based criteria. Source: Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (2015) 
4.2. Data
We obtained data on Corporations (SAs) and Limited Partnerships (SLs) who used standard reporting
models  for  their  annual  accounts  over  the  period  2008-2013 and concerning:  personnel  expenses,
financial expenses, depreciation allowances, taxes, dividends and reserves. Those companies that could
not be classified as family or non-family firms following the criteria above were also eliminated. In the
end, a total of  8,609 Spanish companies, of  which 5,109 are family-owned, and 3,500 other non-family
firms comprise the sample used. A total of  51,654 observations were made by company and reporting
period.
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5. Results of  the Analysis
5.1. Descriptive Analysis
In Table 2, we can observe the evolution of  average VA throughout the period with respect to the
family/non-family nature of  the company, as well as the evolution of  each of  its components.
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TermAverage
Dif. 2008-
2013
Value added FB 15,467 15,036 15,113 15,458 14,891 15,048 15,169 -271%NFB 31,426 31,524 31,064 32,505 29,832 28,696 30,841 -8.69%
Wage expense FB 8,085 7,959 8,100 8,199 8,114 8,020 8,080 -0.80%NFB 11,890 11,792 12,074 12,901 12,057 11,928 12,107 0.32%
Financial
expense
FB 1,474 1,182 1,116 1,338 1,386 1,390 1,314 5.15%
NFB 3,923 2,983 2,662 2,989 3,035 2,797 3,065 -28.70%
Amortization +
Provisions
FB 3,384 3,615 3,448 3,436 3,066 3,383 3,389 -0.03%
NFB 6,716 7,761 8,130 7,354 7,745 6,588 7,382 -1.91%
Tax expense FB 792 739 826 739 744 733 762 -7.45%NFB 2,451 2,189 2,302 1,956 2,157 1,892 2,158 -22.81%
Dividends FB 1,731 1,541 1,625 1,746 1,581 1,522 1,624 -12.07%NFB 6,446 6,799 5,896 7,304 4,839 5,491 6,129 -14.82%
Table 2. Average VA levels and its components.2008-2013. (Thousands of  euros)
It was observed that, on average, NFBs generate higher VA, obtaining levels double those of  FBs. This
result is explained by the financial constraints on the growth of  FBs, resulting in smaller firm size, as
well  as  in a lesser emphasis  on firm profits  in favour of  other criteria,  such as both management
control and business continuity. Previous work also finds an inverse relationship between the existence
of  family controlling interest and value creation (Camisón, 2001).
On the other hand, the effects that the financial crisis has had on the VA are remarkable, showing a
sharp decrease over the period in both FBs and NFBs. The worsening of  net profits during the years
covered by the sample reduced taxes paid by enterprises, as well as the dividends distributed among
owners. At the same time, the difficulties in gaining access to credit and in efforts to reduce debt levels
are  also  reflected  in  a  reduction  in  financial  expenses,  especially  among NFBs  more  propense  to
borrow, while FBs, with a greater preference for self-financing, started from lower levels of  debt at the
beginning of  the period.
It also draws attention to the fact that the effects of  the financial crisis have been more pronounced
among NFBs, resulting in a reduction of  VA, on average, close to 9%. In this regard, (Gallizo et al.,
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2014) has already observed that the nature of  family businesses, such as less exposure to financial risk
or more qualitative and greater customer loyalty factors, have allowed them to cope with the financial
crisis with greater ease.
5.2. VA distribution for the family firms and non-family firms
In Table 3, we can see how Value Added was allocated among its various components in both FB and
NFB firms over the 2008-2013 period.
Component CompanyType 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Period t
Wage expense FB 59.72% 61.72% 61.84% 62.74% 63.76% 63.69% 62.25% -5.53*NFB 58.57% 61.05% 60.52% 61.25% 62.58% 62.60% 61.10%
Financial
expenses
FB 8.14% 6.51% 5.66% 6.62% 7.01% 6.84% 6.80% 0.78NFB 8.36% 6.65% 5.87% 6.87% 6.82% 6.67% 6.87%
Amortization
+ Provisions
FB 21.36% 21.66% 22.41% 23.87% 23.66% 23.73% 22.78% -11.76*NFB 20.07% 20.09% 20.63% 21.90% 21.93% 21.93% 21.09%
Taxes FB 5.23% 5.00% 5.28% 4.82% 4.53% 4.74% 4.94% 1.90NFB 5.20% 4.85% 5.40% 5.09% 4.83% 4.86% 5.04%
Dividends FB 3.17% 3.10% 3.34% 3.41% 3,03% 3.37% 3.24% 27.06*NFB 5.94% 5.51% 6.32% 6.16% 5.67% 5.81% 5.90%
* Statistically Significant Differences at a +/-5% Confidence Level
Table 3. VA allocation by type of  business
We can see that  in both types of  companies,  most of  the VA generated goes to personnel costs,
between 59 and 64% of  VA in FBs, and between 58 and 63% in NFBs. The second, next-greatest
element  in  terms  of  percentage  of  VA  received  is  self-financing,  with  the  funds  earmarked  for
reinvestment via depreciation and the provision of  reserves measured to be about 23% of  VA in FBs,
and around 21% in NFBs. The other components receive a much lower proportion of  VA (financial
expenses between 6% and 8%, about 5% for taxes, and dividends above 3% in FBs, and about 6% in
NFBs). 
As we suggested in our working hypothesis, the results in Table 2 confirm the existence of  significant
differences between FBs and NFBs when allocating VA. These differences are reflected in the amount
of  VA that goes to personnel costs,  and especially to dividends and self-financing,  which is  where
greater divergence between FBs and FNBs is clear.  Moreover, no statistically significant differences
were observed in the proportion of  VA destined to financial expenses or taxes.
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5.2.1. Labour remuneration
In Table 3, we see how FBs allocated a larger share of  Value Added to employee compensation for
each year of  the sample, resulting in statistically significant differences with respect to NFBs. These
results contrast with our initial hypothesis that FBs allocate lower relative VA amounts to pay their
workers.
This result, however, would not conflict with the idea of  lower overall pecuniary remuneration in FBs,
offset by other rewards such as trust, loyalty or greater job stability. As proof  of  this, in Table 4 we can
see how the average wages in FBs are lower than in NFBs, also with statistically significant differences.
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 t
NFB 45.83 46.39 47.47 47.15 48.74 47.81 12.23*
FB 40.73 40.66 43.00 41.70 40.97 41.55
Table 4. Staff  costs per worker
In short, while FBs on average pay lower wages, they also are allocating a greater proportion of  VA to
labour remuneration, indicating that NFBs would be paying out greater relative amounts to other, non-
labour stakeholders.
5.2.2. Return on equity: Dividends
Table 3 shows significant differences between FBs and NFBs in the proportion of  VA destined to the
returns on equity throughout the entire period, as initially assumed. These results confirm the higher
pressure existing on NFBs from shareholders to sustain the levels of  dividends received, even in times
of  crisis. To the contrary, in the case of  FBs, the owners are more willing to give up part of  their
income in exchange for maintaining the levels of  self-financing of  the firm.
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5.2.3. Returns to the Company Itself: Self-Financing
The results of  the study reinforce the initial impression that FBs allocate a greater proportion of  VA to
self-financing as compared to NFBs. This is due to risk aversion and the desire to maintain debt levels
that do not endanger the continuity of  the company for future generations. In this manner, as pointed
out in  Galve and Salas (2011), FBs are characterized, in general, by a financial constraint that affects
their growth, provided the firm generates sufficient resources to finance that growth, while keeping
risks under control without excessive exposure to risk of  the family estate.
Therefore, the study confirms that FBs allocate a greater proportion of  VA for reinvestment in the
company as compared to NFBs.
5.3. Labour Productivity
In order to analyse the relationship between labour productivity and wages paid to workers, we analysed
the correlation between the two variables in both FBs and NFBs (Table 5).
 VA/SE andSE / num. workers
VA / num. workers and SE /
num. workers
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.036p = 0.000
0.250
p = 0.000
FAMILY BUSINESSES 0.115p = 0.000
0.234
p = 0.000
NON-FAMILY BUSINESSES 0.032p = 0.000
0.331
p = 0.000
Table 5. Correlation between Labour Productivity and Average Salary Expense (SE)
A weak yet statistically significant relationship indicating that companies that pay higher compensation
to their personnel gain greater labour productivity is observed among both FBs and NFBs. This leads
us to accept Hypothesis 1, consisting in a posited positive relation between the two.
In Tables 6 and 7, we can observe that FBs are less productive in terms of  workforce in all sectors
analysed. That is, they generate less VA both in relation to staff  costs incurred, as well as in terms of
head count,  and therefore,  in  this  instance,  we reject  Hypothesis  2;  namely,  that  "FBs are  able  to
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leverage their ties with employees, longevity in the workforce and other advantages from workforce
stability in order to produce positive differences in productivity compared to NFBs."
Sector Company Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Period
Primary FB 2.55 2.72 2.45 2.32 2.65 2.52 2.53NFB 16.78 12.70 64.22 93.35 8.73 6.44 33.70
Secondary FB 2.22 2.13 2.07 2.09 2.10 2.12 2.12NFB 6.03 2.80 2.70 2.76 2.80 2.81 3.32
Tertiary FB 2.89 2.79 2.70 2.80 2.62 2.60 2.74NFB 4.66 4.84 5.70 4.48 4.69 5.57 4.99
Table 6. Labour Productivity (VA/SE) by Type of  Business
Sector Company Type 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Period
Primary FB 77.17 87.69 81.97 74.29 87.93 84.74 82.30NFB 1,336.65 1,969.13 2,680.71 1,408.42 962.63 591.13 1,491.44
Secondary FB 126.80 118.85 116.66 123.64 121.80 129.42 122.86NFB 192.26 162.21 155.66 163.19 171.39 156.81 166.92
Tertiary FB 190.00 216.62 181.68 186.20 171.91 180.19 187.76NFB 252.64 329.49 333.38 335.61 427.16 388.52 344.47
Table 7. Labour Productivity (VA/Num. Employees) by Type of  Business
The results are consistent with those obtained in Galve and Salas (2011). These authors found that a
preference  for  control  determines  the  growth  and  investment  decisions  of  family-owned  firms.
According  to  their  results  Family  businesses  choose  to  produce  in  less  capital-intensive  settings
providing evidence that growth restriction is concomitant with preference for control. However, there
may be factors of  a  qualitative nature which could also justify this  result,  and which we have not
addressed  in  this  study;  such  as,  for  example,  the  lower  skill  levels  associated  with  less  formal
management training at family businesses (Cromie et al., 2001), which also could impair their efficiency.
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6. Conclusions
This paper presents a comparative analysis of  the allocation of  added value in FBs and FNBs, in an
attempt to quantify if  there are differences and/or similarities between the two on the basis of  their
being or not family businesses.
We have tested how Value Added ratios show the level of  efficiency regarding a company’s use of
productivity of  labour, calculated by the ratio Value Added per number of  employees and Value Added
per Wages.
Analysing a sample of  8,609 companies, the study results confirm both the higher creation of  VA by
NFBs, motivated by their larger size and bottom line orientation, as well as the existence of  significant
differences between FBs and NFBs in the distribution of  VA among the various stakeholders who
contributed to its creation.
In  both  types  of  companies,  most  of  the  VA  is  dedicated  to  covering  staff  costs,  followed  by
reinvestment in the company, with allocations to other factors being less. However, FBs do dedicate a
greater proportion of  VA to reinvestment as compared to NFBs, due to a preference for maintaining
control of  the company in family hands, limiting risk, and ensuring continuity for future generations.
For their part, NFBs distribute a larger share in the form of  dividends, due to increased pressure from
shareholders for immediate compensation for the capital contributed. We have also observed that FBs
assign a higher percentage of  VA to the remuneration of  their employees, although it is true that they
pay on average lower wages in absolute terms when compared to NFBs.
The study has also shown evidence of  a deterioration in business results over the period, as is clear
from the significant drop in the wealth generated. This decline was particularly notable in the case of
NFBs, in which taxes paid and dividends distributed were drastically reduced. Family-owned businesses
also experienced this setback, although by virtue of  their lower debt financing, they managed to soften
the negative impact on profits.
Finally,  a  direct  relationship  between  wages  and  labour  productivity  in  both  FBs  and  NFBs  was
observed. Furthermore, the results show lower labour productivity among FBs compared to NFBs, a
result that can be attributed not only to the lower monetary rewards to their workers, but also to the
fact that FBs choose to carry out their business employing less capital-intensive technologies, and have
a strong preference for control, restricting their growth and investment levels. 
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We have  worked  with  labor  productivity,  but  in  later  work,  it  would  be  interesting  to  see  if  the
investments of  family businesses are less sensitive to economic crises than those of  non-family firms.
Additionally, it will be interesting to study the share of  added value when introducing the influence of
the CEO when he is not a member of  the control family. This will be a line of  future research.
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